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Corporate governance refers to the manner in which companies are directed and controlled. 
Business  management  was  always  guided  by  certain  principles,  but  the  current  meaning  of 
corporate  governance  concerns  and  the  contribution  that  companies  must  have  the  overall 
development of modern society. Romania used quite late in adopting a code of good practice in 
corporate governance, being driven, in particular, the privatization process, but also the transfer 
of control and surveillance of political organizations by the Board of Directors (BD). Adoption of 
codes of corporate governance is necessary to harmonize internal business requirements of a 
functioning market economy. In addition, the CEE countries, the European Commission adopted 
an  action  plan  announcing  measures  to  modernize  company  law  and  enhance  corporate 
governance. Romania takes steps in this direction by amending the Company Law, and other 
regulations, although the practice does not necessarily keep pace with the requirements. This 
study aims on the one hand, an analysis of the evolution of corporate governance codes adopted 
in  Romania,  but  also  an  empirical  research  of  the  implementation  of  corporate  governance 
principles  of  a  representative  sample  of  companies  listed  on  the  Bucharest  Stock  Exchange 
(BSE).  Consider  relevant  research  methodology,  because  the  issuer  of  the  Codes  of  CG  in 
Romania is BSE listed companies requesting their voluntary implementation. Implementation 
results are summarized and interpreted at the expense of public reports of the companies studied. 
Most studies undertaken in this direction have been made on multinational companies which 
respects the rule of corporate governance codes of countries of origin. In addition, many studies 
also emphasize the fair treatment of stakeholders rather than on models of governance adopted 
(monist/dualist) with implications for optimizing economic objectives but also social. Undertaken 
research attempts to highlight on the one hand, a misapplication of the principles of corporate 
governance in Romania at present, but also a lack of transparency in the dissemination and 
publication of information. They should promote a Board of Directors determined and would 
allow stakeholders access to information about the company. Research results can provide a 
basis for reconsidering the CG policies in Romania. 
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In Europe, the first corporate governance code was issued in 1992 Cadbury Code (Sir Adrian 
Cadbury was Chairman of the Board of Cadbury Company for 14 years). This was the basis for 
the  Code  of  Corporate  Governance  and  the  London  Stock  Exchange  has  held  three  basic 
principles of corporate governance (Cadbury 1992: 16), namely: transparency, integrity and 
responsibility. Later, as a result of financial scandals that have destabilized the operation of the 
British system, to reconsider the importance of corporate governance; quality of implementation 
of recommendations contained in the Cadbury Code was discussed in a series of progress reports 
issued in the coming years. ￿
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In the EEC, information on "Corporate Governance in Europe" published in June 1995. Changes 
and  improvements  to  the Codes  of  CG  occur  throughout  this  period  so that in  March  2010 
adopted  the  Code  „ecoDa  Corporate  Governance  Guidance  and  Principles  for  Unlisted 
Companies in Europe” issued „The European Confederation of Directors' Associations (ecoDa)” 
(ECGI). This Code of CG includes a set of 14 principles that focus specifically on the protection 
of minority shareholders in the face of possible abuses by controlling shareholders. CG system in 
Europe is considered an insider system (Clark 2007: 10), characterized by the presence of active 
shareholders  within  the  corporation  and  is  in  direct  business  relationship  with  the  entity. 
Therefore,  concentrated  ownership  is  associated  with  the  control,  mission  management 
stakeholders seeking  interest  groups,  to  increase  added  value for  them.  In  addition,  business 
strategy proclaims active involvement in the long term, the stakeholders. 
In Romania, the need to implement the rules of CG was determined by the privatization process 
which required companies to improve management practices, on the one hand, and the transfer of 
control and surveillance of political organizations by the BD, on the other hand. With the advent 
of the first law of privatization (in 1991) empowered the State Council was replaced by Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) and was established and BD. CG implementation rules was a way to 
harmonize internal business requirements of a functioning market economy. 
 
Codes of Corporate Governance in Romania 
The  first  Code  of  CG  in  Romania  was  issued  in  June  2000  by  the  International  Center  for 
Entrepreneurial Studies and was the target of public companies listed on BSE. Code rules have 
not been so well received by the market on the ground that they had particular regard to the 
protection  of  minority  shareholders.  Subsequently,  in  2008  issued  the  Code  of  Corporate 
Governance of BSE, which comprises 19 principles, namely: 
-  I: Companies will adopt clear and transparent structure of corporate governance that will 
adequately disclose the general public; 
- II: Companies are obliged to respect the rights of shareholders and ensure their fair treatment; 
- III: Companies will make every effort to achieve an effective and active communication with 
shareholders; 
- IV: Companies are driven by a BD that meets regularly and makes decisions that allow them to 
fulfill their duties of an effective and efficient manner; 
- V: BD is a company responsible for its management and functions as a collective body, based 
on an accurate and complete information; 
- VI: The structure of a company's BD will ensure a balance between executive and non executive 
members, so no one person or group of people can not dominate, in general, the CA decision; 
- VII: A sufficient number of BD members will be independent directors, meaning that they have 
or  recently  had,  directly  or  indirectly,  any  business  relationship  with  the  issuer  or  persons 
involved, of such importance as to influence their objectivity views; 
-  VIII:  BD  has  a  membership  that  ensures  its  ability  to  monitor  effectiveness,  analyze  and 
evaluate the work of directors as well as fair treatment of shareholders; 
- IX: Election of Board members will be in a formal, rigorous and transparent; 
- X: BD will assess whether it is possible composition of a Nominating Committee consisting of 
its members and composed mainly of independent directors; 
- XI: Companies will provide the services of managers and executives with a good professional 
and ethical profile of a reliable remuneration policy, consistent with the strategy and long-term 
interests of these companies; 
-  XII:  Corporate  governance  structures  in  place  to  ensure  that  an  adequate  and  continuous 
periodic  reports  on  all  important  events  on  the  company,  including  financial  situation, 
performance, ownership and direction; ￿
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- XIII: BD will adopt strict rules to protect society's interests in the areas of financial reporting, 
internal control and risk management; 
-  XIV:  BD  will  take  appropriate  operational  solutions  to  facilitate  proper  identification  and 
resolution of situations in which a director has a material interest in its own name or on behalf of 
third parties; 
- XV: BD of members will make decisions in the interests of the company and will not take part 
in  debates  and  decisions  that  create a  conflict  between  their  personal interests  and  those  of 
society or of a subsidiary company controlled; 
- XVI: BD will determine, after consultation with the structures of internal control, approval and 
implementation procedures for transactions with the Company or its subsidiaries parties; 
-  XVII:  Administrators  and  managers  will  maintain  the  confidentiality  of  documents  and 
information received during their term; 
- XVIII: Corporate governance structures must know and recognize the legal rights of interested 
third parties - stakeholders - and to encourage cooperation between this company and to create 
prosperity, jobs and businesses to ensure sustainability of financially sound; 
- XIX: Where to adopt a dualist management system, the previous principles are properly applied, 
adjusting the dual system of uniform provisions in full conformity with the objectives of good 
corporate governance, information transparency and investor protection and market. 
The  situation  presented,  it  appears  that  the  19  principles  14  principles  aimed,  directly,  BD, 
powers  and  functions,  with  emphasis  on  the  independence  of  non-executive  managers.  This 
situation is surely The World Bank made recommendations for our country as a result of a study 
undertaken for the period 2001-2006 in 17 countries in transition (McGee 2008: 22-51). The 
study focused on changes in practices CG, is analyzed how to comply with its principles. The 
results of the analysis revealed that Romania was ranked five, along with Bulgaria and Slovakia 
in terms of CG principles. 
In these circumstances, the World Bank recommendations across Romania have followed two 
major directions: 
-  need  to  increase  the  role  of  BD  and  the  need  for  the  introduction  of  specialist 
committees to advise the board; 
- meetings of the AGM of listed companies to take part and have their external auditors 
provide  explanations  on  how  shareholders  have  met  the  obligations  set  out  in  the 
investment contracts. 
Based  on  these  recommendations,  but  also  fund  measures  to  modernize  company  law  and 
enhance  corporate  governance  in  CEE,  announced  by  Directive  2006/46/EC  (Directive 
2006/46/EC), national legislation is amended in line with requirements EU to improve disclosure 
on corporate governance practices applied in companies. Short-term priorities of Community 
action in this area have included targeting: confirm the collective responsibility of directors and 
improving information on applied corporate governance practices in companies. According to 
the plan of action, members of the administrative, management and supervision of a company 
must act within the powers conferred upon them by law. Also, companies whose securities are 
admitted  to  trading  on  a  regulated  market  and  which  have  their  registered  office  in  the 
Community are required to submit an Annual Statement on the CG when the company applies the 
corporate governance provisions other than those set by national whether these provisions are set 
directly into a corporate governance code under which the company or any corporate governance 
code which the company may decide to apply. 
For the system of corporate governance adopted to contribute to improving the company's value 
creation potential, it is not sufficient to cover only the concern of legal and financial dimension 
CG (separation property or function of the management), it is important managerial dimension of ￿
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value  creation  is  an  effect  of  applying  a  set  of  skills  in  a  context  based  on  discipline  and 
accountability. 
In this regard, the Companies Law no. 31/1990 made some changes, of which the most important 
concerns about the GC: 
- By constitutive act or decision of the AGM may provide that one or more members of 
the BD must be independent; 
- GM may decide to create independent advisory committees charged with conducting 
investigations  and  making  recommendations  for  the  board,  in  areas  such  as  audit, 
remuneration  of  directors,  managers,  auditors  and  personnel  management  functions, 
committees will submit to the board regularly Reports on their activities; 
-  at  least  one  member  of  each  committee  created  to  be  independent  non-executive 
directors;  audit  committee  and  remuneration  shall  consist  only  of  non-executive 
directors; 
-  constitutive  act  may  stipulate  that  companies  stock  is  managed  by  a  Directorate 
(Managing  Board)  and  a  Supervisory  Board  (the  dual  system  of  administration); 
Managing  Board  exercises  its  functions  under  the  control  of  the  Supervisory  Board; 
Supervisory Board members can not be simultaneously members of the Directorate and 
can not aggregate membership of the supervisory board of the company's employee. 
We note that the law requires companies are joint stock companies to create advisory committees 
be independent, or to use the dual system of administration, implicitly assumes an independent 
board, that the Supervisory Board. 
In line with good governance practices reconsideration has been changed and the basic rules 
which  guide  companies  currently  in  Romania,  namely  with  the  adoption  OMPF  3055/2009 
included  is  a  new  section  (Section  11)  for  internal  control,  believed,  moreover,  a  pillar  of 
corporate governance. In that legislation insisting on internal control purposes, namely to ensure 
consistency  of  objectives,  identifying  key  success  factors  to  the  entity's  management  and 
communication, real-time information on performance and future prospects. Whatever the nature 
or size of the entity, efforts to implement sufficient internal controls related to the application of 
good  practices.  In  addition,  a  new  statement  included  in  national  legislation provides that  a 
separate section of the management report will present information on corporate governance. 
Aunt companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market will include 
information  on  the  CG  section  to  a  statement  will refer to: corporate  governance  code that 
applies to the entity or who voluntarily decided to apply; since, according to national law, the 
entity is removed from the code of corporate governance that apply or who chose to apply; an 
explanation of it on the parts of code that do not apply and the reasons for not applying. 
 
BSE's Corporate Governance requirements. Case Study 
Therefore, in accordance with the Code of the CG BSE in 2008, companies whose financial 
instruments are traded on a regulated market operated by the BSE will adopt and comply with a 
voluntary basis, the Code of Corporate Governance issued by BSE. In this sense, “issuers” are 
required  to  enclose the  Annual  Report, starting  with  the  year  2009, “Corporate  Governance 
Compliance Statement" – “Comply or Explain Statement“ (CES). This statement is designed 
based on the 19 principles included in the BSE Code of Governance which in turn are developed 
38 recommendations, according to the Corporate Governance Code Guidelines prepared by the 
Institute  of  CG  of  BSE, which  provides suggestions  implemented  according to  best  practice 
internationally. 
“Comply or Explain Statement” even start with the last principle stated in the Code of CG, 
namely:  "The  issuer  is  administered  under  a  dual  system?"  Therefore,  we  believe  that  as 
accounting, is considered the going concern basis on which other principles are based, as in the ￿
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GC, if that principle in mind, a lot of other principles and recommendations should be easier to 
comply. Further, the “Comply or Explain Statement” required by BSE calls for issuers to develop 
a CG Regulations to be posted on their websites CG defining structures, functions, powers and 
responsibilities and leadership BD executive.  In addition, the annual report should contain a 
separate section for CG to be described all the relevant events related to the CG, recorded during 
the  previous  financial  year.  Also  require  issuers  to  post  on  the  BSE  website  updated 
memorandum,  indicating  the  list  of  board  members  are  independent  members,  members  of 
executive management and the specialized committees and CV for each member of the BD and 
the executive management. Recommendation No. 8 "Comply or Explain Statement" requires that 
every issuer to disseminate in a section on its website on shareholder rights and the rules and 
procedures for participation in the AGM. 
The  main  "concern"  of  CES  balance  between  executives  and  aimed  at  non-executive 
(independent),  so  that  no  person  or  group  of  people  can  not  dominate  the  decision  making 
process  of  BD.  It  also  recommended  that  the  activity  was  BSE,  BD  to  have  the support  of 
independent advisory committees to examine specific topics and advice on these topics BD (it is 
the Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee and Nomination Committee). CES concludes 
with the question: "Issuer activities on social and environmental responsibility of the company?" 
We see therefore that the emphasis is increasingly more on corporate social responsibility, both 
by  government to assist all stakeholders, but also by a positive attitude towards society and 
environment  in  general.  Romania's  attitude  and,  in  particular,  the  Exchange  regarding  the 
requirements of increasingly stringent on the CG follows, of course, bringing the European and 
international practices in this area. 
To demonstrate that the adoption of codes and practices are the results of CG in Romania, we 
conducted a study of companies listed on BSE in category I and II (total of 65 companies). 
Among the most important findings, we report: 
only three of the analyzed companies are managed under a dual system of administration 
(Carpatica SA, OMV Petrom SA, Prodplast SA); 
- six companies have published “The Comply or Explain Statement” for the year ended 
December 31, 2010 (Azomure￿ SA, BRD GSG SA, Ropharma SA, Aerostar SA, Altur 
SA); 
- 23 of the 65 companies analyzed, the offices of president and general manager of BD 
are owned by the same person; 
- 21 companies make no claim related to the CG, just over 15 companies  information to 
shareholders, while other companies (CEMACON SA, Comp SA, Farmaceutica Remedia 
SA, TMK Artrom SA, Terplast SA) presents only the information contained the opposite 
association GC Code requirements; 
- 8 companies have adopted codes of their CG and post CG information in a separate 
section on their websites (Alro SA, Antibiotice SA, Azomure￿ SA, Transelectrica SA, 
Ropharma SA, Transgaz SA, Altur SA, Carpatica SA). 
Reported  findings  from  the  study  conducted  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the  principle  of 
transparency in our country - entered the first principle of CG Code: Cadbury Code - still more 
to the statement included in state codes CG. Consequently, the analysis that the other two basic 
principles  of  GC  -  integrity  and  responsibility  -  become  quite  difficult,  as  long  as  the 
dissemination  and  disclosure,  which  should  promote  a  determined  BD  stakeholders  to  allow 
access to information about the company is limited. 
 
Conclusions 
Even if the failure of principles and recommendations contained in different codes GC is still 
punishable by law, however, compliance has the effect of self discipline listed companies. If we ￿
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consider the governance model adopted at the continental level in terms of study undertaken on 
the 65 companies listed on BSE, a weakness for 50% of the companies reviewed is that they are 
governed  by  the  model  tier  (in  a  single  Council  meets  both  executive  and  non-executive 
managers), without the position of President to be separate from that of Managing Director. This 
does not just increase the power improperly President-General Manager, administrators can not 
take action only in a collegial manner. On the one hand, it is considered that directors should be 
an overall responsibility; on the other hand, their power could only peer, without being able to 
work  towards  disapproval  of  the  conduct  of  the  President.  So  long  as  personal  interest 
overshadowing corporate social responsibility, investor confidence is destroyed and thus require 
reconsideration of the principles of CG, especially in terms of improved quality and transparency 
of financial reporting. We believe that restoring investor confidence in capital markets may be 
the consequence of a high degree of stringency of corporate governance rules. Negative findings 
drawn  from  the  study  may  be  the  consequence  of  the  adoption  of  a  voluntary  code  CG. 
Imperative and mandatory adoption and implementation of codes of good practice could be a 
solution. 
As political power, economic power must be limited by separating the executive managers of 
non-executive  managers,  and  by  dispersing  ownership.  Any  shareholder  has  the  tendency  to 
abuse its power of control and lack of separation of the two categories of managers will lead 
undoubtedly to a concern for personal interest, let alone the interests of the company. In this 
respect, the dual structure of governance (either by separating the office of President of the 
General Manager, either by separating the Executive Board of Supervisory Board), that the legal 
obligation  to  publish  the  mode  of  remuneration  of  managers,  the  presence  of  independent 
directors, transparency in dissemination and publication of information in order to be allowed 
access to all information about the company stakeholders is a plurality of conditions for effective 
governance of companies, which will lead undoubtedly to optimize their economic and social 
objectives. 
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